Research
- Schulz, M. (forthcoming). Kleine Entscheidungen, große Entscheidungen: Ein philosophischer Wegweiser (München: Verlag C.H. Beck).
- Dinges, A. (2026). Against individualistic accounts of group belief. The Philosophical Quarterly. Advance article.
- Boardman, S. (2026). The surprise account of modal knowledge acquisition. Synthese, 207: 144.
- Boardman, S. (2025). The agentive achievement of acceptance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 111: 3–24.
- Dinges, A. (2024). Assertion and certainty. The Philosophical Quarterly, 74/1: 169–186.
- Dinges, A. (2024). Absolute gradable adjectives and loose talk. Linguistics and Philosophy, 47/2: 341–360.
- Schulz, M. (2021). Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief. Synthese 199: 8069–8090.
- Schulz, M. (2021). Strong knowledge, weak belief? Synthese, 199: 8741–8753.
- Dinges, A. (2022). Degrees of acceptance. The Philosophical Quarterly, 72/3: 578–594.
- Dinges, A. (2021). Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do. Analysis, 81/2: 199–207.
